Precaution is a relevant and much-invoked value in environmental risk analysis, as witnessed by the ongoing vivid discussion about the Precautionary Principle (PP). This paper argues (i) against purely decision-theoretic explications of PP; (ii) that the construction, evaluation and use of scientific models falls under the scope of PP; (iii) that epistemic and decision-theoretic robustness are essential for precautionary policy-making. These claims are elaborated and defended by means of case studies from climate science and conservation biology.
Introduction. Science, Policy and Precaution.
The interplay of environmental science and public policy is nowadays the subject of vivid discussion, especially in environmental risk analysis. Conservation biologists make up lists of endangered and acutely threatened species.
Environmental economists study the effects of specific environmental policies on issues such as water quality, air pollution or toxic waste. Most prominently, climate scientists advise policy-makers about the causes and consequences of global warming (e.g., IPCC 2007).
In these contexts, a precautionary attitude is often of great relevance. For instance, the participants of the UN summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992) stated in their final declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely adopted by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. (UNCED 1993) But what does the demand for precautionary policy imply for environmental science? As a matter of fact, a precautionary approach is often required or recommended for studies on ecological risks of economic developments, assessments of the survival chances of endangered species, or biosecurity risk assessments. For example, in the annex to the criteria for classifying endangered species, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) states that Assessors should [...] adopt a precautionary but realistic attitude to uncertainty when applying the [classification] criteria, for example, by using plausible lower bounds, rather than best estimates, in determining population size [...] . (IUCN 2000, 25) In this context, using lower bounds instead of best estimates is a natural way of implementing precaution into one's analysis. However, assessment problems are often more complex than such simple estimation problems, and
it is unclear what a "precautionary attitude" in scientific modeling really amounts to. This paper analyzes the role of precaution in environmental risk analysis. More specifically, it tries to explicate the Precautionary Principle (PP), which plays a prominent role in environmental law and environmental policymaking. Thus, the topic is relevant from both a philosophical and a policy perspective.
The paper is structured as follows: First I argue, building on the existing literature, that explications of PP as a specific decision rule or as an alternative to standard decision theory are bound to fail (Section 2). Second, I
transfer PP to questions of model construction, evaluation and use in the environmental sciences. Third, I elaborate the main thesis -robustness is an essential part of a precautionary attitude -from two case studies, one in climate science (Section 3), one in conservation biology (Section 4). I conclude by summarizing my findings, sketching their implications and responding to objections (Section 5).
Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
The Precautionary Principle -a successor of the German Vorsorgeprinzipintends to guide decision-making in the face of environmental hazards and scientific uncertainty. It has, by now, achieved a prominent position in environmental policy, as witnessed by its inclusion in international treaties, declarations and legal systems (Trouwborst 2006) . Its applications may include cases as diverse as approving of the exploitation of natural resources, This wording is somewhat stronger than the one agreed upon at the Rio summit: now, it is about actively taking precautionary measures, not about whether scientific uncertainty is a valid reason for inactivity. PP now imposes the requirement to refrain from actions and policies that run a risk of causing harm to the public or to the environment. Notably, it is not required that science has established the harmfulness of such actions beyond reasonable doubt (cf. Sandin 1999; Wiener et al. 2010 ).
Precaution supposedly applies at the final, decision-making stage of the analysis -after science has informed policy-makers about the potential environmental hazards. It is about approving or not approving of a certain activity. In that understanding, the Precautionary Principle is akin to a first-order decision rule: a rule for transforming an assessment of uncertainties and potential losses into a final decision (cf. Hansson 1997) .
Several interpretations of PP -especially by its critics -presuppose such a reading and let it compete with decision rules such as expected utility maximization, maximin, and the like. These explications often focus on the probability of a fatal outcome:
PP α If one act is more likely to give rise to a fatal outcome than another, then the latter should be preferred to the former.
PP β If one act is more likely to give rise to a fatal outcome than another and if both fatal outcomes are equally undesirable, then the latter should be preferred to the former. Peterson (2006) shows convincingly that these decision rules conflict with attractive principles of rational choice. Let us assume (1) that preferences are totally ordered, that is, they are complete, asymmetric and transitive, (2) that our decision rules obey dominance reasoning, (3) that shifting probability from bad to good outcomes can only increase the desirability of an action.
1 However, in either explication (PP α or PP β ) PP is logically incompatible with these three principles.
The source of the problem is the intuition that both the probability and the desirability/potential harm of an outcome matter, and that they can, to some extent, be traded off against each other. This view is deeply entrenched in most accounts of rational decision-making, but it conflicts with the above explications of PP. More precisely, PP α and PP β oppose the view that if we (marginally) increase the likelihood of a fatal outcome, we can counterbalance this risk by (substantially) increasing the likelihood of a favorable outcome.
Peterson also investigates refinements of PP α and PP β , but concludes that they suffer from the same problem.
Apart from these decision-theoretic concerns, such a reading of the PP is also unrealistically conservative. That is, it focuses exclusively on the possibility of disasters and makes effective action virtually impossible (Harris and Holm 1999). For some discoveries, like new medical drugs, it is impossible to rule out adverse effects a priori; nevertheless, the benefits of a successful innovation can sometimes be so great that it seems to be reasonable to take the risk. Indeed, the consequences of such a reading of the PP would be so absurd that one may charge the critics of basing their points on a very uncharitable interpretation.
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Moreover, the difficulty of specifying meaningful, empirically-based subjective probabilities of extreme, harmful events (such as "runaway climate change in a scenario without CO 2 abatement") speaks against an interpretation as a probabilistic decision rule. This concern is particularly outspoken in climate science where the ability of climate models to support subjective probability assessments as a basis for decision-making is often problematized (e.g., Frame et al. 2007 ).
Since In the spirit of the COMEST report, Steele (2006, 29) surmises that PP might be best understood as (i) urging us to thoroughly survey the decision space (herein she follows Resnik 1987 ) and (ii) promoting "an ethical outlook consistent with the ideal of sustainable development", giving intraand intergenerational equity a "significant influence [on] the evaluation of act outcomes". Thus, Steele focuses on the ends to pursue rather than the means to achieve these ends.
Carefully surveying the decision space is certainly a useful aspect of precautionary policy-making, but it does not explain why PP does and should play such a prominent role in environmental policy-making. After all, this is a good thing to do in almost any decision problem. Moreover, it may be doubted that the Precautionary Principle is primarily about the ethical goals that one should have, rather than about how to reach these goals in the face of uncertainty. Therefore, the readings proposed by Resnik and Steele do not constitute a fully convincing explication of PP. This prompts the legitimate question of whether we could not better drop PP at all: if we cannot give it a concrete meaning, the principle may be more confusing than helpful.
In reply to this challenge, I contend that precaution in environmental risk analysis has substantial implications for the way scientific models are built, evaluated and used. More precisely, I argue that robustness is, both in its epistemic and its decision-theoretic form, a key element of precautionary policy-making. These different facets of robustness are elucidated by means of two case studies to which the next two sections are devoted.
3. Case Study I: Climate Models and Climate Policy.
In the economics of climate change, there is a classic and very influential analysis by Nordhaus (1991) . He argues on the basis of a specific economic model that reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be an economically inefficient strategy: for low and medium damage functions of climate change, very little reduction will be the best strategy. Only for high damage functions, a substantial reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (about 33%) will be the best option.
Intuitively, this analysis sounds highly optimistic given the range of scientifically possible scenarios where substantial, irreversible damage occurs (e.g., In other words, to rationally defend non-abatement as a precautionary policy, one would require that most models assess the costs of mitigation as significantly higher than the costs of adaptation. After all, while we have some control over the economic costs of mitigation, we might not be able to control the costs of unmitigated global warming. But the emerging consensus in climate economics rather suggests the contrary: immediate mitigation is, in the long run, a way more efficient and less costly strategy than pure adaptation.
This small example suggests that we might best understand precaution in terms of robustness. An act that allows for certain environmental hazards has duly taken into account precautionary considerations if diverse, structurally different models indicate that these hazards may be negligible. Structural differences may occur along the dimensions of target system, scale, physical motivation, time horizon, and so on. This reading of PP can be defended especially well if no single best model is available such that the analysis has to rely on the results of diverse models. In climate science and climate economics, these conditions are more often than not satisfied.
To some extent, this view is supported by the focus on multi-model ensembles in climate science: "averages across structurally different models empirically show better agreement with observations because individual model biases tend to cancel" (IPCC 2007, WG I, 754) . See also Tebaldi and Knutti (2007) . This response to the large uncertainty in climate modeling is also inspired by robustness considerations and constitutes a substantial shift from For example, "equilibrium climate sensitivity is very unlikely to be less than 1.5
• C" (original emphasis). The fact that this is the unanimous result of structurally different models increases our confidence that the value of equi-librium climate sensitivity will indeed be greater than 1.5 • C. Whereas for a single model, all kinds of uncertainties may invalidate the conclusion, and individual model biases cannot cancel out each other.
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Thus, rather than a straightforward principle of decision-making, precaution in environmental risk analysis becomes a matter of assessing and responding to model uncertainty. And since precaution is sensitive to how much agreement between structurally different studies is observed, robustness becomes one of its essential elements.
Case Study II: The Sumatran Rhino.
The explication of PP sketched in the previous section does not apply when there are no competing models of a single phenomenon. In this case, the understanding of precaution as robustness has to differ from cross-model consistency. Rather, we have to look for ways to make our conclusions more robust within a single model. To illustrate this point, I present two different risk analysis for the Sumatran rhino conservation problem.
The original analysis (Maguire et al. 1987 ) evaluated the available options -translocation, new reserve, and captive breeding -by means of ranking them according to their expected utility. In that model, the utility function is defined as a decreasing linear function of the probability of extinction in various states of the world. The probabilities for the possible hazardspoaching, loss of habitat, etc. -were elicited by means of expert judgment.
A simplified summary of such an analysis is given in table 1. 4 See Justus 2012 for a discussion of the confirmatory value of robustness in environmental science.
5 Table 1 is no representation of the actual results of Maguire et al. (1987) Maguire et al. (1987) .
The act "captive breeding" has the highest expected utility and was, in fact, the one recommended by the scientists and implemented by the policymakers, with disastrous consequences. Post mortem, this is not surprising since captive breeding is especially vulnerable to demographic accidents in the captived population, which is a quite likely hazard. Underestimating the probability of that event can have far-reaching effects for the expected utility of captive breeding. Unfortunately, environmental management problems are often characterized by substantial uncertainties, casting doubt on the accuracy of the probabilities and utilities that figure in the model.
To overcome these problems, Regan et al. (2005) conducted a re-analysis of the conservation problem and replaced the expected utility analysis by means of Yakov Ben-Haim's (2006) info-gap approach. The principal idea of info-gap consists in choosing the option which allows for the greatest deviation from an initial best estimate, while still satisfying a given performance threshold.
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To make this idea more precise, assume that we want to estimate an unknown function of the variable t by an estimateû(t). The core idea is to define a info-gap model U(û, α) of the initial estimate: namely the set of functions u(t) such that the fractional deviation ofû from u (or another reasonable divergence measure, such as the L 2 norm) does not exceed a threshold α:
The threshold value α is here called the horizon of uncertainty: it reflects the quality of the initial estimate and determines which functions u(t) are taken into account, dependent on their distance from the initial estimate. Any available option q in the original decision problem can now be assessed in terms of the minimal return it ensures, for a given horizon of uncertainty α.
This assessment is conducted by giving the robustness function of a decision q: the maximal horizon of uncertainty for which q still yields an acceptable outcome, that is, a loss L(q, u) below the critical value l c . α(q, l c ) = max α : max
In other words,α quantifies the local robustness of a decision q regarding uncertainty in the estimateû(t), by indicating the highest horizon of uncertainty for which a satisfactory decision (as measured by the loss function L)
is always ensured.
In the example of the Sumatran rhino, the posthumous analysis of Regan et al. (2005) shows that such a perspective would lead to a different decision.
When the estimated probabilities and utilities in the original analysis are subjected to an info-gap analysis, we realize that captive breeding is only for a narrow horizon of uncertainty superior to the other options. See figure 2. As soon as the uncertainty attached to the probabilistic estimates increases, captive breeding becomes more vulnerable to error, and we may be better advised to establish a new reserve. This decision may then justifiably be called a more robust choice.
This approach has a variety of virtues. By means of the horizon of uncertainty, robustness considerations are directly built into the model. Moreover, we can directly plug-in our best scientific model and evaluate the estimates based on that model. On the other hand, the performance of info-gap depends on the quality of the initial estimate. Therefore info-gap addresses the issue of local rather than global robustness, that is, it conducts a sensitivity analysis around the initial estimate. In particular, info-gap does not take into account that the initial estimate may be grossly mistaken -then it would be clearly inadequate to maximize the horizon of uncertainty around that value (Sniedovich 2010 ).
All in all, the Sumatran rhino case study demonstrates how a precautionary attitude motivates a different approach to environmental risk analysis that improves upon naïve expected utility maximization. In this specific case, a more precautionary analysis (info-gap) focuses on the robustness of a best estimate under various forms of uncertainty. Again, a decision is just as precautionary as the estimates on which it is based are robust.
Discussion.
The Precautionary Principle (PP) is a well-known principle for making environmental policy decisions on the basis of scientific findings. This paper has argued that the construction, evaluation and use of scientific models falls under the scope of PP, and it has investigated how a precautionary attitude in environmental risk analysis can be explicated in practice. Before concluding, I discuss two possible objections to the main theses of this paper. First, it could be argued that robustness is something that we would like to pursue anyway, that it is not specific to environmental decision-making. But the knowledge basis for our decisions can change quickly, as the case of climate science convincingly illustrates. Thus, responsible decision-making needs to conserve some skepticism about our current state of knowledge, even if it is informed by our best science. This speaks for making decisions on the basis of conclusions that obtain under a variety of different assumptions. Moreover, especially in international contexts, policy decisions are difficult to overturn, given the lengthy and cost-intensive delib-erations required to reach an agreement in the first place. For those reasons, robustness should play a central role in environmental risk analysis.
Second, given that PP has been developed as a principle for policy-making, my proposal seems to give too much weight to the scientific dimension of precaution. Two counterarguments can be given: First, we have seen that explications of PP in terms of a principle that only applies to final decisions do not hold water. Second, recent research in philosophy of science (e.g., Douglas 2009) has argued that a strict division of (scientific) risk assessment and risk management (policy-making) is unrealistic.
Following up on that last point, we note that the details of applying PP in a concrete case inevitably demand scientific expertise beyond "providing the numbers". Precautionary environmental decisions demand an intense dialogue and joint efforts of scientists and policy-makers, rather than separating the two domains.
